Former convicts lose second chance in discrimination suit against moving company

March 27, 2018

Tyson Fisher

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Despite an appellate court giving two former employees of a moving company a second shot at a district court ruling against them, the lower court doubled down on its original jury verdict by denying the plaintiffs a wrongful termination claim by way of discriminating against their criminal past.

On May 31, 2017, an appellate court vacated a 2014 district court jury verdict in favor of Allied Van Lines regarding discrimination. Trathony Griffin and Michael Godwin accused the company of having them fired for past criminal convictions. The two men worked for Astro Moving and Storage Co., which signed a contract with Allied.

In the original district court case, Griffin and Godwin were awarded damages for unpaid overtime wages by Astro. The wrongful termination portion of the lawsuit applied to Allied Van Lines and Sirva, Allied’s parent company.

Griffin and Godwin were hired by Astro in 2008 and 2010, respectively. In June 2010, Astro entered into a contract with Allied, which required the moving company to adhere to Allied’s Certified Labor Program guidelines. One such guideline is to pass a criminal background test.

Griffin and Godwin failed and were subsequently fired. They sued the companies for unpaid wages (minimum wage, overtime, etc.) and discrimination regarding race and previous criminal convictions. They won damages for unpaid overtime, but all other claims were invalid.

The New York State Human Rights Law holds employers liable for employment discrimination on the basis of the criminal convictions, according to federal court documents. However, the district court found that Allied was not a direct employer of Griffin and Godwin and therefore not liable for denying employment. This was based on the alleged employer’s power to order and control the employee in his or her performance of work, court documents reveal.

Although the appellate court agreed that Allied was not a direct employer and therefore not liable under that definition, the appellate judges also opined that the law has another condition in Section 296(6) that reads:

“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.”

Under those conditions, the appellate court decided “the district court had read Section 296(6) too narrowly” and that it extends liability to persons and entities beyond joint employers, including out-of-state defendants.

As a result, the case was thrown back to the district court and remanded for further proceedings. On March 6, the district court granted Allied and Sirva summary judgment while denying the drivers’ partial summary judgment.

According to court documents, the district court relied on “collateral estoppel” to deny the plaintiffs’ another trial. Collateral estoppel prevents further litigation of legal determination of fact and law that have resulted in valid final judgments, as defined by Cornell Law School. Essentially, a party cannot bring the same suit under the same issues in another venue or at another time. This prevents abuse of the courts and double jeopardy.

The Astro employees did not appeal the original jury verdict. Rather, they appealed a previous decision granting Allied summary judgment, arguing that the jury verdict does not mean that the jury found no violation. Plaintiffs claim “the jury found Astro not liable because the jury believed that Astro was compelled by defendants to discharge plaintiffs.” Plaintiffs then argued that the “verdict did not necessarily mean that the jury found no Human Rights Law violation.”

In the end, it came down to an interpretation of the condition in Section 296(6) mentioned above. Plaintiffs argued that even if Allied and Sirva did not actually “aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce,” they certainly “attempted to do so.” Not according to the district court.

“The Court finds the interpretation that section 296(6) prohibits attempts to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce, rather than attempts to discriminate, more persuasive,” the court ruled. “This interpretation not only follows a more natural reading of statutory text but is also supported by legislative history.”

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